By Andrew Rowson – 1st December 2023
This is the first in a series of articles exposing the
obstructionism by Cambridgeshire County Council (CCC) finance officers after
local electors asked to inspect and have copies of documents and accounting
records relating to the draft annual financial statements. That public right is enshrined under Section
26 of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 (LAAA 2014).
For the last seven years, two local electors, (one a
former County Councillor) have been repeatedly denied our inspection rights at
CCC for no good reason, often being lied to, or else we have received
information that has been doctored or manipulated in some way.
Following the same unacceptable treatment
during this year’s public inspection period, I wrote to the Chief Executive last
month, complaining about the denial of information again this year. Two weeks ago I received an email from CCC’s
Finance department. Instead of providing
the missing information, which had all been requested within the statutory
inspection period ending on September 1st, the officer attempted to justify the
council’s conduct of withholding the information, using bogus arguments and
incorrect facts.
Since the CEO
personally took ownership of my complaint, I conclude that he condones and has
approved of his officers’ conduct.
Consequently, I shall shortly be writing to the Council Leader, Cllr
Lucy Nethsingha, asking her to instruct the officer body to comply with the
legislation and to provide the missing information.
City Deal again.
In a recent article on this website I challenged CCC to
issue legal proceedings following its shameful bullying tactics against a local
journalist who published an opinion piece about the materially false accounting
of government City Deal grants. The
article that offended the authority was republished on this website three
months ago.
Since then, I have heard nothing from CCC. It has clearly decided against putting its
money where its mouth is after its earlier theatrical threats against the
journalist. The inescapable conclusion is
that the authority’s silence is a tacit, but nonetheless eloquent admission
that it deliberately and fraudulently falsified its financial statements for
several years, overstating its assets and usable reserves by £218m in the
aggregate between 2016/17 and 2019/20, including a £97.8m prior year “correction”
to the 2015/16 accounts which had previously correctly accounted for that
year’s £20m City Deal grant.
That being
the case, this website will from now on drop the word “alleged” when
referring to the uncorrected false statements in CCC’s financial accounts.
The breakdown of the overstatements is shown in the table
below. It was explained in some detail
to every elected member in January this year, and has been explained many times
to members serving on the council’s Audit & Accounts Committee. Nobody has challenged the facts, which come
from the authority’s audited financial statements.
CCC’s current and previous auditors (EY and BDO), who I have
publicly accused of being complicit in the false accounting, have also failed
to come forward with any legal challenge.
The last article quoted EY’s contorted explanation from its
decision notice in March this year for not correcting the accounting
errors in the five financial years before 2020/21, after it had belatedly
corrected the same accounting error for the final 2020/21 accounts (see bottom
line in the table above).
The false accounting of City Deal grants is related to two
of the requests for information in this year’s public documents inspection
which the authority refused to provide.
Back in September 2017, when CCC Finance and the then
auditor BDO first decided to falsify the accounts, they did so on the false assertion
that the government attached no conditions to how the City Deal grants
were to be spent. In fact, conditions
have always been attached to the grants, as the authority and its current
auditor now concede.
Had there been no conditions, the monies ringfenced for the
Greater Cambridge Partnership (GCP)’s specific capital infrastructure projects under
City Deal could have been spent on items beyond the ring fence, including
relieving pressures on CCC’s own revenue budgets rather than finding in-year
savings.
Therefore, in my inspection request
dated 17th August this year, I asked for the sums spent on City Deal
projects during the financial year, the full list of cost centres in CCC’s
financial system designated for City Deal projects and, if that list did not
fully reconcile with the stated expenditure, the explanation, or reconciliation
of where that expenditure had gone.
The point of requesting the full list of City Deal cost
centres was to be able to check the total City Deal spending for the financial
year against those cost centres from the published Transparency Code spend
data.
Twelve days after the request, Finance provided the summary figures
below, followed by a list of 64 titles under the heading “Cost centres”. When they were cross-referenced to the true
cost centres in the Transparency Code database, 45 of the 64 (70%) were not
cost centres at all – rendering any reconciliation exercise impossible. The following day (August 30th), I
informed Finance of its error, reiterating that I was looking to reconcile the declared
City Deal expenditure total for 2022/23 (£27,846,194) against the payments in
the Transparency Code payment data in the corresponding City Deal cost
centres. I also asked for confirmation
that the true list of City Deal cost centres only captured bona fide City Deal
spend and nothing else. I never received
an answer to that question.

At 1.41pm on Friday 1st September, the final day
of the inspection period, I received an email from Finance containing 32
attachments. The 32nd
attachment was a revised list of 45 City Deal cost centres, 41 of which matched
with cost centres in the Transparency Code data that had recorded payments
against them. The finance officer
explained that the earlier list had included “capital project titles rather
than capital cost centres”. It is
hard to understand how Finance could have made that mistake accidentally, given
the clarity and the context of my repeated requests for cost centre titles.
After matching the revised cost centre list with published
payments to those cost centres during 2022/23, the total payments fell short of
the £27.8m by £10.9m (39%). The
difference is orders of magnitude higher than can be explained by timing
differences between expenditure and payment dates, or by any payments below
£500, which are not included in the published payment data.
The significant discrepancy might be explained by the
following four factors, or by a combination of them:
- Bona fide City Deal expenditure was incorrectly
coded to cost centres other than those provided by Finance as the full list of
City Deal cost centres,
- Bona fide City Deal expenditure was correctly
coded to the corresponding cost centres, but a significant proportion of payments
were simply removed from the Transparency Code datasets prior to
publication. CCC has a long and
disreputable track record for doing this,
- Substantial expenditure contributing to the
£27.85m total above was spent on non-City Deal-related items, and coded to
other cost centres - in breach of the government’s grant conditions that CCC
has belatedly recognised,
- Substantial expenditure contributing to the
£27.85m was not related to City Deal and was never recorded in CCC’s payments
system, but instead was syphoned off from the City Deal pot by means of general
ledger journals to support the County Council’s revenue budgets – again in
breach of the clear City Deal grant conditions set out in the grant
determination documents and other grant agreement documents.
- By waiting twelve days before providing an initial response,
then providing incorrect and useless information, and finally by providing an
incomplete response to my request on the very last afternoon of the inspection
period,
- Finance again employed similar tactics to previous years to deny a local
elector his statutory inspection rights.
Because of the scale of the City Deal discrepancy in 2022/23, and the
authority’s previous lie (maintained for four years) that there were no
conditions associated with the capital grants, there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that a large part of the missing payments may be explained by the
fourth factor above.
That suspicion is
given added substance by clear references in public committee documents to “
internal
borrowing” from unspent City Deal grants to spend on items unconnected to
City Deal projects.
As reported in the previous article, further concern comes
from the fact that if one takes the opening City Deal balance above (£87.3m),
and compares that with the known grant receipts dating back to 2015/16, and the
disclosed payments to cost centre descriptions prefixed with “City Deal”
or “GCP”, the City Deal expenditure not showing in the Transparency Code
payment data rises to around £47m up to March 2023.
Instead of explaining these anomalies, which
might yet have an innocent explanation, CCC has set itself on a course of
explaining nothing, covering everything up, and attempting to discredit the
people who ask legitimate questions about how these government grants have
been, and are being spent.
Questions about the governance and transparency of City Deal
grants are not frivolous, and local electors are entitled to seek assurances
that their money is being properly managed in a transparent fashion. The fact remains that there is a yawning £47m
hole in the transparency of how City Deal grants have been spent (£10.9m in
2022/23 alone).
This authority’s endless
ducking and diving to avoid providing the information properly requested under
s26 of LAAA 2014 is a reprehensible denial of the public’s inspection rights,
and does nothing to quell the many concerns about how City Deal grants have
been managed and spent. The Chief
Executive Officer’s role in defending the indefensible conduct of his officers is
an outrage.
A second request during the inspection period was for the
signed City Deal grant funding agreement, complete with terms and conditions,
as set out in the Treasury’s “Managing Public Money” document, and also
in the Cabinet Office’s Guidance for General Grants.
I was repeatedly denied that document as
well. Instead, Finance officers pointed
to a government press release which contained a short document for public
consumption which was not signed and did not contain any of the detail or terms
and conditions specified by the Treasury and the Cabinet Office. That document was
certainly not the grant funding agreement for the potential payment of £500
million worth of government grants over fifteen years.
Echoes of the GCGP LEP
Cambridgeshire County Council has been in a similar position
before. In 2017, North East Cambridgeshire
MP Stephen Barclay raised concerns about the transparency and governance of the
former Greater Cambridge/ Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP),
and the LEP Chairman’s conflicts of interest.
As with City Deal, CCC was also the accountable body for the LEP. Investigations and critical reports by the
National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee followed.
In January 2018, CCC’s then CEO –
Gillian Beasley, and the LEP Chairman, Mark Reeve were questioned by MPs, who
were dissatisfied by and severely critical of their responses about accountability and transparency. The upshot was that £38m of planned
government funding was withheld, and the LEP was scrapped.
In respect of the City Deal reconciliation and the other
inspection requests denied by CCC again this year, the authority seems
determined to conceal important information from local electors and in so
doing, disregard the law.
Consequently,
in addition to writing to the council leader, I am also escalating the matter
to my Member of Parliament, Lucy Frazer KC MP, the Culture Secretary.